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Rights to Healthcare in the United States:
Inherently Unstable
David Orentlichert
1. INTRODUCTION
Although international covenants have long recognized a fundamental right to
healthcare,' and other countries provide healthcare coverage for all of their citizens,
rights to healthcare in the United States have been adopted only grudgingly, and in a
manner that is inherently unstable.2 While a solid right to healthcare would provide
much benefit to individuals and society, the political and judicial branches of the
U.S. government have granted rights that are incomplete and vulnerable to erosion
over time.
3
Unfortunately, enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(ACA) does not change these fundamental weaknesses in the regime of U.S.
healthcare rights. Millions of Americans will remain uninsured after ACA takes full
effect, and rather than creating a more stable right to healthcare, ACA gives unstable
rights to more people. As a result, even if ACA survives its constitutional
challenges, access to healthcare still will be threatened by the potential for attrition
of the rights that ACA provides.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Historically, rights to healthcare in the United States have been weak because
courts have rejected the possibility of "positive" rights under the Constitution. 4
t Samuel R. Rosen Professor and Co-Director, Hall Center for Law and Health, Indiana
University Robert H. McKinney School of Law. M.D., Harvard Medical School, J.D., Harvard Law
School. This Article builds on an earlier piece, David Orentlicher, Health Care Reform: Beyond
Ideology, 301 JAMA 1816 (2009).
1 Eleanor D. Kinney, Recognition of the International Human Right to Health and Health Care in
the United States, 60 RUTGERS L. REv. 335, 338-39 (2008) (describing the right to healthcare in the
1948 constitution of the World Health Organization and in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights).
2 See id. at 348-52 (discussing debate over whether U.S. federal government should sponsor
national health insurance legislation, including President Truman's and President Clinton's efforts for
health reform).
3 See James Monroe, American Political Culture and the Search for Lessons from Abroad, 15 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 129 (1990), for a summary of the impact of American political culture and
institutions on health policy.
4 Wideman v. Shallowford Cmty. Hosp., 826 F.2d 1030, 1033 (llth Cir. 1987) ("The
Constitution is 'a charter of negative rather than positive liberties."') (quoting Jackson v. City of
Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983)).
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Rather, constitutional rights are largely limited to "negative" rights. In other words,
while the Constitution may preclude government from interfering with the
autonomous choices of people, it does not require government to facilitate the
exercise of individual autonomy. 6 Thus, for example, legislatures may not prohibit
women from obtaining an abortion before their fetuses are viable, but they need not
provide funding for women who cannot afford the cost of an abortion.7 Similarly,
legislatures may not prevent patients from receiving treatment for their illnesses or
injuries, but nothing in the Constitution imposes a duty on government to ensure that
patients can in fact obtain needed care.8
To be sure, a duty to provide healthcare attaches when the government confines
people in prisons, psychiatric facilities, or other institutions, since the individuals are
not free to seek healthcare on their own. 9 But for most people, the Constitution is not
helpful.10 Accordingly, when people are unable to afford medical treatment, they
have had to rely on common law or statutory rights to healthcare."'
III. STATUTORY RIGHTS TO HEALTHCARE
A. THE GRUDGING NATURE OF U.S. HEALTHCARE RIGHTS
Statutory rights are the primary source of rights to healthcare in the United
States, but they have been adopted only grudgingly. 2 Consider, for example, the
history of Medicare and Medicaid.
1. The Passage of Medicare and Medicaid
Medicare and Medicaid grew out of a five-decade history of efforts to enact
national health insurance in the United States.' 3 The effort began around 1912 during
the Progressive Era. 14 Germany and other European countries had adopted
id.
6 Id. ("[The Constitution] tells the state to let people alone; it does not require the federal
government or the state to provide services ....") (quoting Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th
Cir. 1982)).
7 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980)
8 Wideman, 826 F.2d at 1033. As the abortion example indicates, a refusal by government to
provide coverage for care can effectively mean a denial of care. Medicare policy also illustrates this
connection between funding and access. If the Medicare program decides not to reimburse physicians
for a particular treatment, the treatment will not be available for the great majority of Medicare
recipients. Cf N.Y. State Ophthalmological Soc'y v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 1379 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(preventing physicians from billing Medicare recipients for the cost of an assistant surgeon during
cataract surgery without prior approval by the Medicare program).
9 MARK A. HALL, MARY ANNE BOBINSKI & DAVID ORENTLICHER, HEALTH CARE LAW AND
ETHICS 120 (7th ed. 2007) (discussing institutional responsibilities of mental hospitals).
10 Wideman, 826 F.2d at 1032 ("[W]e can discern no general right, based upon either the
Constitution or federal statutes, to the provision of medical treatment and services by a state or
municipality.").
" See HALL, BOBINSKI & ORENTLICHER, supra note 9, at 120 n.5.
12 A number of states recognized a right to receive emergency care at a hospital by common law.
Id. at 106-09, 114.
13 See JONATHAN OBERLANDER, THE POLITICAL LIFE OF MEDICARE 1 8-22 (2003), for a general
discussion of national health insurance between 1912 and 1952.
"4Id. at 18.
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government healthcare plans by then, 15 and Teddy Roosevelt championed healthcare
reform in his losing presidential campaign of 1912. When Roosevelt lost to
Woodrow Wilson, the cause was taken up by the American Association for Labor
Legislation, which supported healthcare coverage for industrial workers.
16
Interestingly, the national healthcare movement was supported by the American
Medical Association (AMA) at that time. 17 Indeed, a committee of the AMA
reasoned that physicians' "blind opposition, indignant repudiation, bitter
denunciation of these laws is less than useless; it leads nowhere and it leaves the
profession in a position of helplessness as the rising tide of social development
sweeps over it.
By 1920, the effort to enact government-sponsored coverage had stalled, in part
because more conservative elements at the AMA led to a reversal of the
association's support for government-sponsored healthcare coverage. 19 Opposition
also came from the insurance industry, the pharmaceutical industry, employers, and
labor unions.20 (The labor leader Samuel Gompers apparently feared that benefits
gained through legislation rather than negotiation would be vulnerable to later repeal
or limitation.2 1 He probably also felt that benefits won by negotiation would make
workers more likely to support unions.22)
Timing often matters to the success of legislative reform, and opponents of a
right to healthcare could exploit U.S. involvement in World War I against Germany
and the Russian Revolution of 1917. Critics of national health insurance were able to
discredit the policy by connecting it with Germany, which was the first country to
enact a national healthcare plan.23 The link to Russia and its right to healthcare
allowed opponents to argue that national health insurance was a first step toward
socialism.
24
The next push for national health insurance came during the Franklin Delano
Roosevelt administration, and the Social Security bill that was ultimately passed in
1935 originally included a provision for healthcare coverage.25 The combination of
physician opposition and the desire not to compromise the passage of Social
Security, however, led FDR to drop his support for national health insurance.26
The Truman administration initiated the third effort for national health coverage,
but the United States was embroiled in the Cold War, and the AMA again waved the
flag of socialism to mobilize public opposition.27 In addition to the AMA's
important influence, Truman faced a recalcitrant Congress that at the time was
28dominated by a conservative coalition of Republicans and southern Democrats.
15 Germany was the first country to establish a government plan, doing so in 1883. Other
European countries followed, with England adopting a plan in 1911. Id. (citing RONALD NUMBERS,
ALMOST PERSUADED: AMERICAN PHYSICIANS AND COMPULSORY HEALTH INSURANCE 11 (1968)).
16 The American Association for Labor Legislation included academics, labor activists, and
lawyers. Id.
7 1d. at 19.
IS Id. (citing ROBERT J. MYERS, MEDICARE 5 (1970)).
19 Id. (citing BEATRIX HOFFMAN, THE WAGES OF SICKNESS: THE POLITICS OF HEALTH
INSURANCE IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 2 (2001)).
20 Id. at 19-20.
21 THEODORE R. MARMOR, THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE 5 (2d ed. 2000).
22 Id.
23 OBERLANDER, supra note 13, at 18.
24 Id. at 20.
25 Id. at 21.
26 MARMOR, supra note 21, at 5-6; OBERLANDER, supra note 13, at 20-21.
27 OBERLANDER, supra note 13, at 21-22.
28 MARMOR, supra note 21, at 8-9; OBERLANDER, supra note 13, at 21-22.
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After four decades of failure to enact a universal healthcare program, advocates
decided to refine their approach in the 1950s, and the strategy that ultimately led to
the passage of Medicare and Medicaid was formulated. 9 Wilbur Cohen and 1.S. Falk
recognized that a health insurance plan focused on Social Security beneficiaries
would be much easier to sell than a plan for all Americans. 30 By limiting its benefits
to the elderly, Medicare could be portrayed as a program for people who met two
important criteria: 3 1 they had greater need for healthcare coverage and they were
32
especially deserving of public assistance. Because of their age, seniors have
relatively high medical costs-when Medicare was passed, average healthcare
expenses for people sixty-five or older were twice the average expenses for younger
persons. 33 At the same time, the elderly were less able to afford healthcare bills.
34
Medicare would kick in when people no longer were working and were experiencing
a greatly reduced income.35 Moreover, their reduced income did not reflect a lack of
initiative or an attempt to exploit the system. Rather, they had made their
contributions to society and moved into a well-deserved retirement. 36 Cohen and
Falk further restricted their proposal by limiting it to hospital costs (and only sixty
days of hospitalization a year).37
The Medicare proposal was refined further by making it a form of social
insurance rather than public welfare. People qualified themselves and their spouses
for Medicare in the same way that they qualified themselves and their spouses for
Social Security-by making payments to the Social Security system during their
working lives. 38 In other words, while a public assistance program for younger
persons might stifle initiative and promote dependence, the Medicare program
became available for persons who were not expected to be active workers and who
in fact had earned their eligibility.39 Medicare recipients would truly be "deserving"
of their benefits.40
Still, even with a much narrower and politically more appealing range of
coverage, it was not possible to pass Medicare until President Lyndon Johnson's
29 OBERLANDER, supra note 13, at 22-23.
30 Cohen later became Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare under
President Lyndon Baines Johnson. Falk served in senior positions at the Social Security
Administration and had a distinguished academic career at the University of Chicago and Yale
University. See MARMOR, supra note 21, at 9 nn.2-3; Isidore Sydney Falk, SOCIAL SECURITY ONLINE:
SOCIAL SECURITY HISTORY, http://www.ssa.gov/history/ifalk.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2012).
3" OBERLANDER, supra note 13, at 23-24.
32 id.
33 Jd.
34 Id.
31 Id. at 24.
36 MARMOR, supra note 21, at 11-12; OBERLANDER, supra note 13, at 23-24.
37 OBERLANDER, supra note 13, at 25.
38 Medicare includes four major components. Part A covers hospital services and is financed by a
payroll tax, equally shared by employers and employees. Currently, employers and employees each
pay a payroll tax of 1.45% of the employee's earnings. Part A is a mandatory program. KAISER FAM.
FOUND., MEDICARE: A PRIMER 1, 14 (2010), available at www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7615-03.pdf.
Part B covers physicians' services, is voluntary (and taken by ninety-five percent of those who are
eligible), and requires a monthly premium (which is deducted from Social Security payments). The
monthly premium covers about twenty-five percent of costs, with the remainder covered by general
federal revenues. Id. at 1-2, 14. Part C offers beneficiaries the option of receiving their care from a
private Medicare Advantage healthcare plan. Id. at 1. Part D was added in 2006 and provides a
prescription drug benefit. Id.
39 MARMOR, supra note 21, at 15-16, 96.
40 OBERLANDER, supra note 13, at 24-25.
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landslide victory at the polls in November 1964.41 With his election and the election
of a strong majority of Democrats in Congress, conservative Republicans and
southern Democrats were no longer able to block the legislation. a2
By that time, a few proposals were being floated. There was the Cohen-Falk
idea of hospital coverage for the elderly, with mandatory participation for workers
(just as participation in the Social Security system is required)4 3 Republicans
offered a counterproposal for a voluntary program that would subsidize the purchase
of comprehensive private insurance by the elderly.44 The Republicans, then, drew
three important contrasts with the Cohen-Falk proposal.4 a Their program would be
optional rather than required, involve coverage by private companies rather than by
government, and cover all medical services rather than just hospitalization.46 The
third main proposal came from the AMA and involved a federal-state program to
subsidize the purchase of private health insurance for the elderly poor.47 Like the
Republicans, the AMA wanted a plan that was more reliant on the private sector.4 8
The AMA also argued for a means-tested program, on the theory that the
government should not be subsidizing healthcare coverage for elderly persons who
could afford to purchase their own insurance.
4 9
As healthcare reform worked its way through the legislative process, U.S.
Representative Wilbur Mills, Chair of the Ways and Means Committee, came up
with legislation that essentially combined the three proposals:
50
The Cohen-Falk bill became Part A of Medicare, a mandatory program
to cover hospital costs and that would be funded by employer and
employee payroll taxes.
51
The Republican proposal became Part B of Medicare, a voluntary
program for physicians' services (funded by general revenues and
individual premiums).5 2
The AMA proposal was modified from a proposal to cover the elderly
poor to a program that would cover children and some adults under the
age of sixty-five who were unable to afford private health care
coverage. 3 Thus was born Medicaid.
B. THE LIMITED NATURE OF FEDERAL HEALTHCARE STATUTORY RIGHTS
After more than fifty years, the United States finally came in 1965 to accept a
right to healthcare, but even then it was a highly limited right. All seniors would be
eligible for coverage under Medicare, and many of the poor would be eligible for
"' Id. at 29.
42 MARMOR, supra note 21, at 56-57; OBERLANDER, supra note 13, at 29.
43 OBERLANDER, supra note 13, at 24.
44 Two-thirds of the costs would be covered by general revenues and one-third by individual
premiums. Id. at 30.
41 Id. at 30-31.
46 1d. at 30.
47 id.
48 id.
49 MARMOR, supra note 2 1, at 46-47.
51 OBERLANDER, supra note 13, at 30-31.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
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coverage under Medicaid.54 But rather than recognizing a right to healthcare for all
persons, Congress opted to enact a right for those who "deserved" such a right.
As indicated, Medicare beneficiaries were seen as deserving of their new
program because they had earned it through a lifetime of work and financial
contributions. 56 The adoption of the Medicaid program illustrated another way in
which Americans could be seen as deserving of healthcare coverage. Some people, it
was thought, lacked health insurance through no fault of their own. 57 One could not
blame children, for example, for their failure to afford coverage. Medicaid was
enacted as a program for poor persons who did not seem responsible for their lack of
insurance.58 Children, single parents with children, and persons with disabilities
would qualify if their family incomes fell below an eligibility threshold.5 9 All of
these persons were seen as not responsible for their predicament, either because of
60
age or infirmity or because of their childcare obligations.
Thus, while the public commonly thinks of the Medicaid program as providing
universal coverage for the poor, it never was designed to insure all of the indigent.
The Medicaid program requires coverage only for poor people who fall into one of
the mandatory coverage categories ("categorical eligibility"). 6' The mandatory
groups include pregnant women, children, parents with dependent children, and
persons with serious disabilities. 62 Medicaid categories are defined not only by
family status or disability, but also by income. 63 Thus, for example, children usually
are covered when family incomes are no more than 200% of the federal poverty
level, while parents may not be eligible even when family income is below fifty
percent of the federal poverty level.64
Initially, Medicaid eligibility was tied to eligibility for one of the federal welfare
programs (e.g., the old Aid to Families with Dependent Children, now Temporary
Aid to Needy Families (TANF)).65 Thus, Medicaid originally did not cover families
where a father was in the home and working, and other than in a few states operating
under Medicaid waivers, it still does not cover any able-bodied adults who do not
have children.66 With reforms in the Medicaid statute, states have been allowed to
51 Id. at 31.
55 Id. at 32. 1 use the term "deserving" not to indicate my own view, but to characterize what I
believe is a real social ethic in the United States.56 Id. 23-24.
"' Id. at 24.
58 See Cindy Mann & Tim Westermoreland, Attending to Medicaid, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 416,
418 (2004) ("The Medicaid program began by focusing narrowly on . . . children, their 'caretaker
relatives,' and the 'aged, blind and disabled'-all persons deemed too vulnerable to provide insurance
for themselves." (quoting Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 980369, 98 Stat. 494
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.))).
59 KAISER FAM. FOUND., MEDICAID: A PRIMER 8 (2010), available at
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7334-04.pdf [hereinafter KAISER FAM. FOUND., MEDICAID].
60 See Mann & Westermoreland, supra note 58, at 418.
61 KAISER FAM. FOUND., MEDICAID, supra note 59, at 8.
62 Id.
63 id.
64 Id. at 8-9. Indigent seniors also qualify for Medicaid benefits to cover the costs of their
Medicare premiums and co-payments.
65 JONATHAN ENGEL, POOR PEOPLE'S MEDICINE: MEDICAID AND AMERICAN CHARITY CARE
SINCE 1965, at 48 (2006). 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-1 creates the link between TANF and Medicaid. In
addition to covering families with children and a single parent, the federal welfare programs also
provide aid to the blind and others with permanent disabilities. Id. at 48. States have the option to
extend Medicaid coverage to other poor persons, but their freedom to do so is limited. Id.
66 Id. at 49; KAISER FAM. FOUND., MEDICAID, supra note 59, at 8, 12.
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provide coverage to both adults in a two-parent family, and most states do so.6 7 In
2014, barring a Supreme Court override of ACA, Medicaid finally will become a
program for all of the poor (defined as families earning no more than 133% of the
federal poverty level).6
Medicaid falls short of covering all of the poor for another reason; it has not
covered many of those who are eligible for it. While virtually all seniors sign up for
Medicare, many individuals who qualify for Medicaid fail to enroll. 69 As with other
public benefit programs that are "means-tested," Medicaid must screen applicants to
make sure they qualify, and that can discourage people from filing for benefits.70
Qualified persons may be unaware of their eligibility or find it difficult to navigate
the application process. 71 The screening process can be daunting, especially for
poorly educated persons. ACA will simplify the application process, but some
persons eligible for public programs wish to avoid the embarrassment of being a
recipient.72 Having to rely on governmental benefits can be demeaning, and some
individuals prefer to maintain their dignity, even at the cost of forgoing important
services. 73 Universal programs like Medicare, on the other hand, do not carry the
problem of stigma. If everyone receives healthcare through the same program, poor
individuals do not need to feel that participation in the program automatically
identifies them as being poor.74 For all of these reasons, programs targeted at the
poor do not achieve universal coverage of the indigent. Among those eligible for
food stamps, for example, only two-thirds sign up for the benefit.
75
The stinginess of Medicaid is reflected in ways other than its past failure to
reach all of the poor. While eligibility for a federal welfare program has been
necessary to qualify for Medicaid, it has not been sufficient. 76 Medicaid does not
cover everyone who qualifies for a federal welfare program.77 The income threshold
at which one loses eligibility for Medicaid is lower than the income threshold at
which one loses eligibility for cash assistance.7 8 Thus, one can be viewed as so poor
as to need payments from the government to make ends meet, but not so poor as to
need government subsidies for healthcare coverage.79 With its many limitations,
Medicaid has reached less than half of those whose income falls below the poverty
line; according to recent data, Medicaid covers forty-five percent of those with
family incomes below the federal poverty level.80
67 MATTHEW BROADDUS ET AL., CTR. FOR BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, EXPANDING FAMILY
COVERAGE: STATES' MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY POLICIES FOR WORKING FAMILIES IN THE YEAR 2000, at
36 (2002), http://www.cbpp.org/1-2-02health.pdf.
68 KAISER FAM. FOUND., MEDICAID, supra note 59, at 8.
69 Id. at 13.
70 Id. at 8-9.
7' Id. at 13.
72 Id. at 30.
73 PETER K. EISINGER, TOWARD AN END TO HUNGER IN AMERICA 51-52 (1998).
74 See generally Lawrence D. Brown & Michael S. Sparer, Poor Program's Progress: The
Unanticipated Politics of Medicaid Policy, 22 HEALTH AFF. 31 (2003).
75 USDA Food Stamp Program: Food Stamps Make America Stronger, FOOD & NUTRITION
SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., http://www.fns.usda.gov/cga/FactSheets/SNAP.htm (last visited Feb.
26, 2012).
76 See LIZ SCHOTT, STACY DEAN & JOCELYN GUYER, THE CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY
PRIORITIES, COORDINATING MEDICAID AND FOOD STAMPS 5-6 (2001), available at
http://www.cbpp.org/archiveSite/9-14-01 fs.pdf.
7 See id.
78 See id.
79 ENGEL, supra note 65, at 51.
80 KAISER FAM. FOUND., MEDICAID, supra note 59, at 7.
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Besides being grudging in terms of how long it took to be enacted and in terms
of how many of the poor would receive coverage, Medicaid was grudging even in
the way it provided coverage to those who qualified for the program. While
Medicare is fully funded with federal dollars, Medicaid relies on a combination of
state and federal funding. Under Medicaid, the federal government offers matching
dollars to states that provide their own funding. 81 Thus, state governments determine
the amount of Medicaid spending in their states, and marked variations in Medicaid
programs exist from state to state. 82 For example, the number of persons eligible for
Medicaid differs from one state to another. One study found that Colorado's
Medicaid program reached twenty-eight percent of the low-income uninsured, while
the Massachusetts Medicaid program reached fifty-nine percent.
83
The shortcomings of Medicaid can be measured not only in terms of the number
of people covered, but also in terms of the quality of coverage. For example,
Medicaid pays physicians at lower levels than does Medicare, making it much more
difficult for Medicaid recipients to find a doctor who will take care of them.
84
According to a national survey from 1998-2003, Medicaid's reimbursement rates for
physicians averaged sixty-two percent of Medicare rates in 1998, rising to sixty-nine
percent of Medicare rates by 2003. 85 Some states fall well below the average. In
Maryland in 2001, Medicaid reimbursed physicians at thirty-six percent of the rate
that Medicare reimbursed physicians. 86 Thus, while researchers in one study found
that dermatologists would accept as new patients eighty-five percent of Medicare
beneficiaries (and eighty-seven percent of persons with private insurance), they
would take on only thirty-two percent of Medicaid recipients.
87
Critics also have observed that Medicaid tries to shoehorn poor persons into a
healthcare model that is better tailored for wealthier persons. 88 Simply giving people
an insurance card and relying on them to find a healthcare provider ignores issues of
access for poor persons. They often live in areas underserved by physicians and
hospitals, and they may not have automobiles or public transportation to get them to
areas adequately served by the healthcare system. 89 In addition, lower-income
81 ENGEL, supra note 65, at 48.
82 KAISER FAM. FOUND., MEDICAID, supra note 59, at 5.
83 Mann & Westermoreland, supra note 58, at 418 (citing JOHN HOLAHAN, URBAN INST.,
VARIATIONS AMONG STATES IN HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE AND MEDICAL EXPENDITURES: How
MUCH Is Too MUCH? (2002), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310520_DP0207.pdf).
This reflects data before Massachusetts adopted its 2006 healthcare reform.
84 See id. at 420.
85 Stephen Zuckerman et al., Changes in Medicaid Physician Fees, 1998-2003: Implications for
Physician Participation, W4 HEALTH AFF. 374, 379 (2004), available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2004/06/23/hthaff.w4.374.full.pdf.
86 In 2005, the differential narrowed significantly, but Medicaid in Maryland still reimbursed at
only sixty-eight percent of the Medicare rate. MD. HEALTH CARE COMM'N, REPORT ON INCREASING
REIMBURSEMENT RATES FOR PHYSICIANS PARTICIPATING IN THE MARYLAND MEDICAL ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM AND MARYLAND CHILDREN'S HEALTH PROGRAM 2 (2006), available at
http://mhcc.maryland.gov/legislative/increasereimburserpt_0506.pdf.
87 Jack Resneck, Jr., Mark J. Pletcher & Nia Lozano, Medicare, Medicaid, and Access to
Dermatologists: The Effect of Patient Insurance on Appointment Access and Wait Times, 50 J. AM.
ACAD. DERMATOLOGY 85, 88 (2004). This was not always the case. In its first years, Medicaid
reimbursed doctors at higher rates than did private insurers. See ENGEL, supra note 65, at 63. As states
found their Medicaid budgets unaffordable, they began to reduce reimbursement rates. See id. at 62-
63. 88 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK 25 (June 2009).
89 ENGEL, supra note 65, at 52. My own medical experience validates this concern. At one time, I
took care of patients at Wayne County Medical Center (which has since closed). The hospital was
located in one of the western suburbs of Detroit but served patients throughout Wayne County,
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persons are less likely to seek medical care even when cost and transportation
barriers do not exist. 90
Medicaid's problems can be traced in large part to the lack of a strong
constituency at its inception. Conservatives in Congress disliked the idea of the
federal government assuming responsibility for a program that they believed was a
local and state responsibility, and liberals in Congress recognized, for the reasons
discussed above, that Medicaid was poorly designed to meet the healthcare needs of
the poor.91 Those who were involved in drafting the Medicaid legislation and other
staunch proponents of healthcare reform believed that Medicaid would soon be
supplanted by comprehensive reform and therefore did not dwell long on the
program's shortcomings.
92
In recent years, Medicaid programs have fared even worse, as tight budgets
force states to curtail their Medicaid spending.93 Nationally, Medicaid consumes
more than fifteen percent of state spending, and it has been the fastest-growing
component of state budgets. 94 In the past, some states implemented cost-cutting
measures that reduced the enrollment in their Medicaid programs. 95 More recently,
as federal rules prohibited restrictions on eligibility, states have eliminated or
restricted access to particular services, like dental or vision benefits.
96
To be sure, some states have tried to expand their Medicaid programs to cover
more of the uninsured, and there are some important examples of reform. 97 But even
these programs remain underfunded.99 When Indiana passed its "Healthy Indiana
Plan" to provide coverage to uninsured individuals, it did not create an entitlement to
coverage for those who lacked insurance and were not covered under another
government plan. Rather, it offered affordable coverage on a first-come, first-served
basis to uninsured persons, with the number of available slots determined by the
amount of funding raised by an increase in the cigarette tax. According to estimates
at the time of passage, the new plan was expected to provide coverage for 130,000
people, about twenty percent of the number of uninsured persons in the state. 99
However, it only reached about a third of its projected enrollment before ACA was
enacted, and Governor Mitch Daniels restricted enrollment-with the passage of
ACA, the Indiana plan will be phased out by 2013." °'
including residents of Detroit, the county seat. Many of the patients from Detroit lived more than ten
miles from the hospital, and it was common for them to miss their follow-up appointments in the
outpatient clinic because they had no good way to get to the hospital.
90 See id. at 52-53.
91 Emily Friedman, The Compromise and the Afterthought: Medicare and Medicaid After 30
Years, 274 JAMA 278, 278-80 (1995).
92 See ENGEL, supra note 65, at 49-50, 60; see Friedman, supra note 91, at 280.
93 KAISER FAM. FOUND., MOVING AHEAD AMID FISCAL CHALLENGES: A LOOK AT MEDICAID
SPENDING, COVERAGE AND POLICY TRENDS 22-23 (2011), available at
http://kff.org/medicaid/upload/8248.pdf.
9 Id. at 11.
9' Id. at 7.
96 Id. at 38, 46-47.
97 Id. at 7.
9' Id. at 22.
9' KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID FACTS, SUMMARY OF HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN: KEY FACTS
AND ISSUES (2008), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7786.pdf.
100 Dan Carden, State Enrolling More in Health Plan, Nw. IND. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2011,
http://www.nwitimes.com/news/local/lake/gary/article_50744e52-9e45-58c6-9d94-
d0201 Ibe62a2.html.
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In addition to Medicare and Medicaid, there is an additional important statutory
right to healthcare under federal law.1 ' In 1986, Congress passed the Emergency
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA).' 12 Under EMTALA,
emergency departments at hospitals cannot deny care to indigent persons (or anyone
else) who are in active labor or experiencing an emergent need for care.'0 3 While
valuable to the indigent, who no longer can be refused all care, there also are serious
limits to EMTALA. The emergency department only must stabilize the patient's
medical condition. 10 4 There is no duty to fully treat the condition, nor is there any
obligation to provide care in non-emergency circumstances. 105
C. ACA AND THE EXPANSION OF THE U.S. RIGHT TO HEALTHCARE
ACA provides an important improvement of the Medicaid program. Starting in
2014, all individuals with family incomes up to 133% of the federal poverty level
will be eligible for coverage. 1° 6 Moreover, families with incomes between 133 and
400% of the federal poverty level will be eligible for subsidies to help offset the
costs of their healthcare coverage.'
0 7
But ACA does not address important problems with Medicaid. For example, it
will remain a federal-state partnership, and that means that reimbursement rates and
the availability of a physician willing to treat Medicaid patients will still vary from
state to state. 10 8 And even at 133% of the federal poverty level, Medicaid leaves
many families without coverage who cannot afford to purchase it on their own. 109 To
be sure, ACA provides subsidies for low (and even some middle) income families
who earn too much to qualify for Medicaid, but the subsidies may not be adequate to
make private healthcare coverage affordable. Thus, projections indicate that millions
of Americans will remain uninsured after ACA fully kicks in." 10
To this point, I have discussed the grudging nature of healthcare rights. They
have been very slow coming, they have generally not reached all in need, and even
those who qualify for coverage are unable to have their healthcare needs adequately
met. There is another important problem with healthcare rights in the United States:
they are formulated in a way that leaves them inherently unstable,
10' Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006) [hereinafter
EMTALA].
102 id.
103 Id.
'04 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., EMTALA: ACCESS TO EMERGENCY MEDICAL CARE 1-3 (2010),
http://aging.senate.gov/crs/medicare20.pdf.
05 HALL, BOBINSKI & ORENTLICHER, supra note 9, at 126-27.
106 Medicaid: Eligibility, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
http://www.medicaid.gov/AffordableCareAct/Provisions/Eligibility.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2012).107 Saving Money for Families and Small Businesses, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
http://www.healthcare.gov/blog/201 1/0I/saving-money.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2012).
108 See KAISER FAM. FOUND., MEDICAID COVERAGE AND SPENDING IN HEALTH REFORM:
NATIONAL AND STATE-BY-STATE RESULTS FOR ADULTS AT OR BELOW 133% FPL 1 (2010), available
at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/medicaid-coverage-and-spending-in-health-reform-
national-and-state-by-state-results-for-adults-at-or-below- 1 33-fpl.pdf (different participation rates key
to variable analysis).
109 See id. (different participation rates imply different amounts of families who can afford to
purchase health insurance after subsidies).
"i' id. at 2.
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D. THE INHERENT INSTABILITY IN U.S. HEALTHCARE RIGHTS
The instability of healthcare rights can be traced to three important features of
those rights. First, they are rights to payment for healthcare costs, but not rights to
receive healthcare. Second, the poor must rely on the willingness of the wealthy to
fund their healthcare costs, and the willingness of the wealthy to do so diminishes as
the availability of a public program generates unanticipated demand for healthcare
services and drives the costs of the program well above initial projections. Third,
other than Medicare, healthcare programs entail federal-state partnerships rather than
programs run solely by the federal government.
1. A Right to Coverage, Not to Care
As discussed earlier, healthcare rights generally recognize a right to payment for
the costs of care, but not a right to receive healthcare. EMTALA ensures that
patients receive healthcare to stabilize their emergency medical conditions, but
under Medicare, Medicaid, and ACA, patients only gain access to insurance to cover
their medical expenses.' They still must find a physician who is willing to accept
payment from their plans. Medicaid patients have long found it difficult to find
willing physicians, and Medicare patients are finding it increasingly difficult too."
12
As healthcare costs continue to rise and health plans contain costs by cutting their
reimbursement rates, difficulties finding physicians will likely get worse." 3
In fact, ACA almost guarantees that Medicare will cut reimbursement rates.
ACA created the Independent Payment Advisory Board ("Board"), which will
develop proposals to keep Medicare spending within strict targets established by
ACA." 4 The Board's proposals will automatically take effect unless Congress
adopts substitute provisions."15 The proposals may not ration healthcare, raise costs
to recipients, restrict benefits, or modify eligibility criteria."16 As a result, ACA
leaves the Board with few options other than reductions in reimbursement rates.
With reductions in reimbursement, physicians will be more inclined to shrink their
Medicare practices and expand their care of privately insured patients.'
17
Many patients not only will find it harder to find a physician who will accept
their coverage, they also will find it harder to afford care once they find a willing
physician. While the Medicaid statute protects its recipients from high out-of-pocket
costs, persons who will rely on the ACA subsidies for private healthcare insurance
will have greater difficulty affording the out-of-pocket costs of their care. In recent
years, employers and insurers have addressed the rising cost of healthcare by making
1 EMTALA, supra note 101.
112 See, e.g., Lisa Zamosky, Medicare Guidance Is Here, L.A. TIMES (July 11, 2011),
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/Il1/health/la-he-health-411-20110711 ("You're not alone when it
comes to having difficulty finding a doctor who will accept Medicare, the government health
insurance program for seniors. People have long complained that doctors have either dropped out of
the program or are no longer accepting new Medicare patients into their practice.").
113 See id.
14 Nancy-Ann DeParle, The Facts About the Independent Payment Advisory Board, THE WHITE
HOUSE BLOG (Apr. 20, 2011, 5:46 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/04/20/facts-about-
independent-payment-advisory-board.
"5 See id.
116 id.
17 See Timothy Jost, The Independent Payment Advisory Board, 363 NEw ENG. J. MED. 103, 104
(2010); David Orentlicher, Cost Containment and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 6
FIU L. REV. 67, 82 (2010).
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patients responsible for a larger share of the costs. 18 Employers are requiring
workers to bear higher payments for their insurance premiums, and they are offering
healthcare plans with higher deductibles and co-payments."19 Patients face a double
whammy. With the higher premium costs, which can total in the thousands of dollars
a year, patients have less money to pay their deductible and co-payments. And the
higher levels for deductibles and co-payments make it more costly to see a
physician. With less money to pay greater fees, many patients are likely to delay or
forgo needed care.
2. The Divergence of Interests Between Rich and Poor
Rights to healthcare in the United States are unstable for a second important
reason. Under Medicaid and ACA (but not Medicare), the interests of the poor are
divorced from the interests of the well-to-do. When Medicaid and ACA expanded
healthcare access, they did so primarily for the poor or lower-income families.'
20
The financially secure generally receive healthcare coverage from their employers,
or can afford to purchase it on their own. 21 Thus, those who are better off see
Medicaid and ACA as programs that serve the poor at the expense of themselves.
122
But with governmental programs like this in the United States, there generally is not
sufficient political support to ensure adequate funding over time. 123 The poor have
little influence in the halls of Congress or the statehouses, and the wealthy are
inclined to disfavor programs that benefit only the poor. Thus, for example,
programs like Social Security and Medicare that serve recipients at all income levels
are far more successful than programs like Medicaid, which target the indigent.'
24
ACA preserves Medicare's broad base of support and improves Medicaid by
imposing a federal standard for eligibility.'25 ACA's expansion of access to
healthcare coverage, however, depends on adding millions more of the poor to
Medicaid, and providing subsidies for the purchase of insurance for those not poor
enough for Medicaid but not wealthy enough to afford healthcare coverage on their
own. Thus, the expansion in coverage depends to a substantial extent on the
willingness of persons with political influence to fund programs for other people.
Experience suggests that their willingness to do so over the long run will be limited.
An important feature of ACA may compromise the willingness of the politically
influential to support adequate funding for ACA's expansion of access. As
mentioned, Medicaid under ACA will cover all of the poor, not just the poor that
118 See Walecia Konrad, When Choosing Health Care, Know What You'll Owe, N.Y. TIMES (July
9, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/10/health/I0patient.html.
119 KAISER FAM. FOUND., EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2011 ANNUAL SURVEY 67, 101-02, 116
(2011), available at http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/2011/8225.pdf. While employees are assuming greater
costs, the percentage share of the costs has not necessarily increased. Id. at 66.
120 See KAISER FAM. FOUND., MEDICAID, supra note 59, at 7 (explaining that Medicaid covers
mostly low-income and high-need populations).
121 See id. (displaying the various means of coverage by poverty level).
122 See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 119 (1987) (noting that taxpayers viewed Medicaid as paying for
services provided to welfare recipients but not to themselves).
"'31d. at 118-20.
124 See id. at 118 ("[O]nly programs based on the principle of equality of life chances are capable
of substantially helping the truly disadvantaged.").
125 See KAISER FAM. FOUND., MEDICAID, supra note 59, at 1 ("[T]he law creates a national
framework for near-universal coverage and also outlines a comprehensive set of strategies to improve
care and contain costs.").
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have historically been viewed as "deserving." 126 From the perspective ofjustice, this
is an important change, and it may reflect a broad view that most of the uninsured
lack coverage because healthcare costs have risen so high. Indeed, during the debate
over ACA, proponents successfully cited the frequency with which unpaid medical
bills contributed to personal bankruptcy filings. 127 But to the extent that voters begin
to see the expanded Medicaid as a program that rewards people who lack initiative
and are responsible for their uninsured status, support for Medicaid funding may
diminish.
The inadequacy of public benefit programs serving the poor is a phenomenon
not only with healthcare programs but also with other public benefit programs. The
food stamps program is able to stave off malnutrition for the most part, but many
poor families suffer from food "insecurity,"'1 28 and the level of food stamp benefits is
not sufficient to cover the costs of a healthy diet. 129 Fresh fruits and vegetables, for
example, can easily overwhelm the grocery budget of a food stamp recipient.
130
Similarly, housing subsidies for the indigent have not been adequate to reach all
those who need a home, and many Americans have to rely on families, friends, or
homeless shelters for a place to reside.'
31
The problem with programs targeted only at the poor can be illustrated further
by the decline in the federal housing program as it became more focused on serving
the indigent. When public housing was developed in the 1930s during the Great
Depression, 132 the federal government did not engage in means-testing, so tenants
came from the solid working class, as well as the unemployed. 133 The housing was
126 See id. at 8 ("Under the new health reform law, nearly everyone under age 65-regardless of
category-with income below a national 'floor' will be eligible for Medicaid .... ").
127 See, e.g., David U. Himmelstein et al., Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007: Results
of a National Study, 122 AM. J. MED. 741 (2009); Catherine Arnst, Study Links Medical Costs and
Personal Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 4, 2009, 8:45 AM),
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/jun2009/db2OO964666715.htm; Nicholas D.
Kristof, Until Medical Bills Do Us Part, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2009, at 8WK. Ironically, ACA may
not in fact reduce bankruptcies driven by medical costs. Many of those who file for bankruptcy carry
insurance, but cannot afford their share of the costs. See David U. Himmelstein, Medical Bankruptcy
in Massachusetts: Has Health Reform Made a Difference?, 124 AM. J. MED. 224 (2011) (finding
healthcare reform in Massachusetts did not reduce number of medical bankruptcies).
12' ALISHA COLEMAN-JENSEN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., HOUSEHOLD FOOD SECURITY IN THE
UNITED STATES IN 2010 (2011), available at www.ers.usda.gov/Publications/ERR125/errl25.pdf.
129 See, e.g., id. at 25; Melanie Mason, Food Stamps for Good Food, THE NATION, Mar. 28, 2011,
at 2 1.130 See Mason, supra note 129, at 21.
13 Housing subsidies may be inadequate for the poor, but they are very generous for the well-to-
do. See GILLIAN REYNOLDS, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, OPPORTUNITY AND OWNERSHIP FACTS NO. 6,
FEDERAL HOUSING SUBSIDIES: To RENT OR To OWN? (2007), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411592_housingsubsidies.pdf. There are important federal
income tax deductions for home mortgage interest and state property taxes. Id. Moreover, the value of
these deductions is greater for the wealthy. See id. Those with larger mortgages, higher property taxes
because of higher home values, or higher marginal tax rates realize the larger deductions. See Stanley
S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with
Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 722-23 (1970). Overall, nearly eighty
percent of federal housing subsidies go to homeowners and only about twenty percent to subsidize
rental payments for the indigent. See Peter Dreier, Federal Housing Subsidies: Who Benefits and
Why?, in A RIGHT TO HOUSING: FOUNDATION FOR A NEW SOCIAL AGENDA 106-07 (Rachel G. Bratt et
al. eds., 2006).
132 There had been earlier, temporary programs for housing, such as a housing program tied to the
war effort in WWI. FROM TENEMENTS TO THE TAYLOR HOMES: IN SEARCH OF AN URBAN HOUSING
POLICY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 19-20 (John F. Bauman et al. eds., 2000).
133 Gail Radford, The Federal Government and Housing During the Great Depression, in FROM
TENEMENTS TO THE TAYLOR HOMES, supra note 132, at 102, 104-06.
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created under the auspices of the Public Works Administration (PWA), which built
or financed fifty-eight housing developments with approximately 25,000 units. The
housing was functional, attractive, and accompanied by community facilities like
parks, libraries, and child-care facilities; hence its appeal to people who could afford
private housing. 
134
While the PWA housing was desirable, public housing that followed and that
was reserved for the poor was especially unappealing. The PWA was a temporary
agency, so housing advocates sought legislation that would authorize a permanent
housing agency.' 35 In 1937, Congress passed the Wagner-Steagall bill over the
objections of industry, particularly from the private housing sector that feared
competition from the government. While they could not block the bill, industry and
its allies succeeded in shaping the legislation in a way that severely limited its
potential for success.'
3 6
Far from launching a universal program for public housing, Wagner-Steagall
targeted its benefits to those with very low incomes, on the theory that a public
program should be reserved only for those whose needs could not be met by the
private market. 37 The Act limited eligibility on the basis of income in two ways.
First, the rent paid, plus utility costs, had to exceed twenty percent of household
income. 138 Thus, families that earned more than five times their housing costs were
not eligible for public housing. In addition, the federal housing agency was
authorized to set absolute income caps, and they were set at levels below the poverty
line. 139
With public housing now reserved for the indigent, Congress imposed
constraints that eventually doomed the quality of public housing. For example,
public housing projects had to be linked to the clearance of slums-the construction
of new dwelling units had to be matched by the elimination of an equal amount of
slum property. 14 The need to clear slum properties led to high land acquisition costs,
leaving fewer resources for the construction of the public housing that would replace
the condemned houses.
14 1
At the same time that higher land acquisition costs were imposed, Congress
included spending caps in the legislation, further squeezing construction budgets.
142
There were limits on how much could be spent in construction costs for an
apartment or even a single room, and public housing projects could not include
"elaborate or expensive design or materials.' ' 143 In addition, public housing projects
had to fall within strict cost limits. 144 These factors alone ensured austerity, but the
U.S. Housing Authority went even further in containing costs, on the theory that
keeping costs to a minimum would help generate public support and allow the
government to maximize the number of housing units it could create.
1 45
134 Id. By 1936, Congress established income limits for the housing projects. Id.
1 Id. at 108-09.
116 Id. at 112.
137 R. ALLEN HAYS, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND URBAN HOUSING: IDEOLOGY AND CHANGE
IN PUBLIC POLICY 93 (1995).
138 Id. For families with three or more children, rent could not exceed seventeen percent of
income. See LEONARD FREEDMAN, PUBLIC HOUSING: THE POLITICS OF POVERTY 105-06 (1969).
139 FREEDMAN, supra note 138, at 106-07.
140 Radford, supra note 133, at 111.
141 id.
142 Id. (citing per unit spending caps of $5000).
143 FREEDMAN, supra note 138, at 116.
144 See Radford, supra note 133, at 111-12 (citing per unit spending caps of $5000).
145 Id. at 111-12; see also FREEDMAN, supra note 138, at 115.
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With all of this belt-tightening, public housing became a failed policy. New
projects in New York City cost half as much per apartment as projects built in the
city by the PWA, and they conjured up images of Soviet-style drabness and
cheapness. 146 Out of this era came the much-discredited public housing high-rise
developments that concentrated poor, mostly minority, residents in the new urban
ghettos.1 47 To minimize real estate acquisition costs, planners preferred high-rise
apartments, which could maximize the number of housing units per acre of land.
48
But high-rise apartments made little sense for families with children. 49 Parents
found it difficult to keep their eyes on children playing many stories below them,
and gangs could readily find members among the large numbers of teenagers
clustered together. 150 Notorious among these projects were the Robert Taylor Homes
("Homes") in Chicago, which comprised the largest public housing project in the
world when completed in 1962.' The Homes housed 27,000 people in buildings
that were claustrophobic and noisy. Moreover, they were located in a community
that lacked green space, that was surrounded by littered streets and few stores or
civic amenities, and that was plagued by gangs, drug dealing, and other crime.1
5 2
The Homes, whose residents were nearly all black and poor, also reinforced existing
patterns of residential segregation. 53 Ultimately, high-rise public housing projects
had to be torn down.
54
We can look not only to the federal government for evidence that public
programs are difficult to sustain when they only serve the poor. The same has been
true for state-run programs. The Oregon Health Care Plan provides a useful
example. 55 In the 1990s, Oregon decided to expand its Medicaid program to reach
all of its poor residents (i.e., those with a family income up to one hundred percent
of the federal poverty level). i56 Instead of providing generous benefits for a limited
number of the poor, Oregon would provide limited benefits for all of the poor. 5 At
first, the program was well-funded, and the percentage of uninsured in the state
dropped from seventeen percent to eleven percent. 58 As the Oregon economy stalled
and government revenues dropped, however, Oregon raised eligibility thresholds,
and within ten years of the plan's implementation Oregon's rate of uninsured had
risen to pre-plan levels.
59
As the Oregon experience indicates, economic pressures make it very difficult
to maintain public programs that primarily serve lower-income persons, and
146 See Radford, supra note 133, at 113 (citing New Yorker's review of first two public housing
complexes in Brooklyn, which describes them as displaying "Leningrad formalism").
141 See id. at 115
148 See FREEDMAN, supra note 138, at 115-16.
14 9 See id. at 116.
50 See id.
'51 Roger Biles, Public Housing and the Postwar Urban Renaissance, 1949-1973, in FROM
TENEMENTS TO THE TAYLOR HOMES, supra note 132, at 143, 149.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Roger Biles, Epilogue to TENEMENTS TO THE TAYLOR HOMES, supra note 132, at 265.
"' See Lawrence Jacobs et al., The Oregon Health Plan and the Political Paradox of Rationing:
What Advocates and Critics Have Claimed and What Oregon Did, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L.
161, 163 (1999); David Orentlicher, Controlling Health Care Costs Through Public, Transparent
Processes: The Conflict Between the Morally Right and the Socially Feasible, 36 J. CORP. L. 807,
813-14 (2011).
56 Orentlicher, supra note 155, at 813-14.
157 Id,
158 Jacobs et al., supra note 155, at 165-68.
159 David Orentlicher, supra note 155, at 814.
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economic pressures are a particular concern in healthcare. Although President
Barack Obama recognized the need for ACA to include cost-containment provisions,
the bill falls far short of what is needed to bend the healthcare cost curve. 60 Indeed,
once the law is fully implemented, it is expected to barely slow the rate of healthcare
inflation, dropping it from 6.8% to 6.7%.161
The willingness of financially secure persons to sustain ACA's coverage
provisions for the poor may be tested further because ACA maintains a dual
healthcare system, with both public and private coverage, rather than switching to a
system based primarily on public coverage. 62 In this dual U.S. healthcare system,
the new public benefits may "crowd out" private coverage, making public coverage
even more expensive for state and federal governments, and therefore less
sustainable over time. That is, people who now have unsubsidized private healthcare
coverage may switch to the expanded Medicaid program or qualify for subsidized
private healthcare coverage.
Of particular concern is the possibility that ACA's subsidies for the purchase of
insurance will encourage employers to drop their healthcare benefits. Currently, if an
employer stops offering healthcare coverage, employees expect the employer to
offset the loss of coverage by raising salaries. 163 That way, workers have funds to
purchase their own healthcare plans. 164 But many employees may be able to
purchase their replacement coverage with governmental subsidies through the
healthcare insurance exchanges that will be created under ACA. In that case, the
employer can effectively shift the costs of employee healthcare coverage onto the
government.165 If this crowd out of employer-based coverage occurs to a significant
extent, it will drive the costs of the subsidies much higher than expected and make it
difficult to sustain ACA for the long term.
How likely is it that employers will drop healthcare coverage and send their
employees to the exchanges? There are a few factors that will discourage employers
from doing so. First, many of their employees may earn too much money to qualify
for meaningful subsidies. 166 Hence, they would have to foot the bill themselves for
policies purchased on the exchanges, and they would expect their employers to raise
their salaries accordingly. Employers would end up paying more for healthcare
benefits. Consider, for example, the costs to employers to provide $10,000 in
healthcare coverage for an employee. If the employer provides the coverage, then it
costs the employer $10,000. If, on the other hand, the employee has to purchase the
coverage on a healthcare exchange, the employer will have to pay the employee
6 0 See id. at 110.
161 See Andrea M. Sisko et al., National Health Spending Projections: The Estimated Impact of
Reform Through 2019, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1933, 1936 (2010).
162 See id. at 1938-40 (describing projected future growth in the distinct areas of public and
private healthcare coverage under the ACA).
163 See Amy Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Will Employers Undermine Health Care Reform by
Dumping Sick Employees?, 97 VA. L. REV. 125, 182-83 (2011).
164 See id.
165 See Richard S. Foster, Estimated Financial Effects of the "'Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, '" as Amended, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 7-8 (2010), available at
http://www.cms.gov/ActuarialStudies/Downloads/PPACA_2010-04-22.pdf ("[S]ome smaller
employers would be inclined to terminate their existing coverage, and companies with low average
salaries might find it to their-and their employees'-advantage to end their plans, thereby allowing
their workers to qualify for heavily subsidized coverage through the Exchanges."); David A. Hyman,
PPACA in Theory and Practice: The Perils of Parallelism, 94 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 83, 84 (2011)
(referencing Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 163, at 127-29).
166 See Hyman, supra note 165, at 102-03. For high-wage workers, the ACA provides only
modest subsidies for obtaining coverage through an exchange. Id.
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$12,000-$13,000 or more in salary. Because of taxes owed on income, employees
need to receive more than $10,000 in income to have $10,000 to spend. The
employer also may incur additional costs. If some of their employees purchase
healthcare on an ACA exchange with a governmental subsidy, then the company
must pay a fine. 167 For many employers, it clearly will be worthwhile to maintain
healthcare insurance as an employee benefit. Hence, researchers have not projected a
significant loss of coverage from employers dropping healthcare benefits.
1 68
Still, that might change as healthcare costs continue to rise, and especially so for
employers with predominantly low-income workforces. Low-income employees will
qualify for Medicaid or receive substantial subsidies to buy private healthcare
insurance, so will not need an increase in salary to compensate for the loss of
healthcare coverage from their employers.' 69 At the same time, the fines that will be
levied under ACA's employer mandates are much smaller than the costs of
providing healthcare coverage. 170 Even if cost pressures do not lead employers to
drop healthcare coverage as an employee benefit, the cost pressures still will make it
difficult to sustain the federal subsidies for Medicaid and for policies purchased on
the healthcare exchanges by lower-income individuals.
In sum, ACA's right to healthcare will suffer from the fact that those who are
financially secure must be willing to pay for the healthcare of the poor, and they
must maintain that willingness even as healthcare costs rise further.
3. Federal-State Partnerships Make for Weaker Programs
The third major cause of instability in healthcare rights lies in the fact that they
often entail partnerships between the federal and state governments. The Medicaid
program provides a useful illustration.' 7' The federal government sets minimum
standards and reimburses most of the costs, but the states determine eligibility and
reimbursement levels for their own residents. 172 As a result, the percentage of
uninsured varies widely from state to state, depending on a state's wealth and the
willingness of its legislators to fund Medicaid coverage. In Texas, for example,
twenty-five percent of the public is uninsured, while only five percent are uninsured
in Massachusetts. 1
73
The deficiencies of federal-state partnerships are seen in other public benefit
programs. When Congress created a permanent food stamp program in 1964 after
some temporary programs, coverage was limited. 174 States could choose whether to
participate in the program, they were allowed to set their own eligibility standards,
and they could implement the program in some parts of the state but not other
parts. 175 Hence, wide variations existed across and within states. In 1970, eligibility
was limited in South Carolina to persons who earned no more than thirty-eight
percent of the federal poverty level, while New Jersey extended its program to
167 See Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 163, at 129 n.8.
168 Christine Eibner et al., The Effects of the Affordable Care Act on Workers' Health Insurance
Coverage, 363 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1393, 1394 (2010).
169 See id.
170 Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 163, at 157-58.
171 ENGEL, supra note 65, at 48-49.
172 id.
173 Health Coverage & Uninsured, KAISER FAM. FOUND., http://www.stateheaIthfacts.org/
comparecat.jsp?cat=3 (last visited Mar. 2, 2012).
174 See EISINGER, supra note 73, at 39.
175 id.
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persons who earned up to eighty-six percent of the federal poverty level. 76 Because
states could choose not to offer food stamps or offer them only in some counties,
only fifty-nine percent of the population lived in counties with a food stamp program
in 1969.177
Congress responded to the access problems with amendments to the original
act.178 These amendments established uniform, national standards of eligibility, and
if states participated in the food stamp program, they were required to include
residents of every county. "By 1975 food stamps were available in every ... [U.S.]
county."'
179
Public housing provides another example of the problems with federal-state
partnerships. This Article previously discussed how housing policy declined in
effectiveness in the transition from the Public Works Administration to the Wagner-
Steagall Act. 180 There was another important change under Wagner-Stegall. While
the federal government decided the location of public housing projects under the
PWA, site selection under Wagner-Steagall was left to local housing authorities.
181
This policy ensured that public housing would be built in inner city settings, as
middle and upper income residents exercised their political strength to prevent the
building of public housing in their neighborhoods. 82 In doing so, local decision-
making resolved an important debate in a way harmful to the future of public
housing. As many advocates argued, the housing should have been built on cheap,
vacant lots at the periphery of cities, and in the form of low-density, scattered site
units.1 83 That would allow for healthier, safer, and less expensive housing, as well as
increase the chances that urban ghettoes could be eliminated rather than recreated.1
84
Locating the new units in the poor areas of cities, however, left them with a stigma
from the outset. 85 The working poor with dreams and prospects of upward mobility
avoided the new housing, leaving behind a high concentration of the poorest of the
poor, who had no place else to go. 186 Moreover, to the extent that residents of public
housing did work hard and move up the economic ladder, they were likely to lose
their eligibility for public housing. 187 Once they exceeded the income limits, they
were subject to eviction.' 88 As the economically successful families left public
housing, they left behind an ever-increasing "culture of poverty."1 89 The tenants who
left because of rising incomes "tended to be the more energetic, ambitious, and
'responsible' tenants" who played leadership roles in the structure and organization
of the public housing communities.190
As indicated, ACA addresses the state-to-state variation in healthcare coverage
under Medicaid to some extent by imposing uniform eligibility standards, but it still
176 Id.
177 id.
178 Id.
179 id.
180 See supra notes 135-54 and accompanying text.
181 FREEDMAN, supra note 138, at 39-40.
182 HAYS, supra note 137, at 92-93.
183 Roger Biles, Nathan Straus and the Failure of US Public Housing, 53 HISTORIAN 33, 39, 45
(1990).
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[88 Id.
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leaves management of the program to the states. There still will be different
Medicaid programs in the different states, each with their own administrative
structures and rules.
IV. THE EROSION OF ACA
While much of my concern lies with the future instability of ACA, it has started
to unravel even before its real implementation. For example, ACA was designed to
address an important shortcoming in the Medicare program-the failure to cover the
costs of long-term care for patients with dementia or other debilitating conditions
who require residence in a nursing home. 191 With the aging of the U.S. population
and its baby boom bulge, the demand for long-term care will continue to reach new
highs in the coming years.' 92 Yet most Americans do not carry insurance for the
costs of long-term care, and they often end up relying on Medicaid for coverage
after depleting their savings.193 During the drafting of ACA, provisions were added
from the CLASS Act, a legislative proposal from previous years, to establish
government-sponsored long-term insurance.1 94 While the CLASS Act provisions
were enacted, it did not take long for government officials to recognize that the
program would not be adequately funded.' 95 The U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) announced in 2011 that it would not be able to implement
the act, and the long-term care problem remains unsolved.
196
In a second potentially significant erosion of ACA, HHS decided that it would
let each state determine the "essential benefits" package required for healthcare
plans sold through the insurance exchanges. 197 This compromises one of the key
features of ACA-the extent to which it adopted federal standards rather than state-
by-state standards.
As discussed, public programs are much more likely to be successful when they
follow federal standards than when they are based on state standards. Medicaid
beneficiaries in many parts of the country have suffered from the fact that states set
eligibility standards and determine reimbursement rates for physicians and
hospitals. 198 Thus, the poor fare much better in states like Massachusetts or New
Jersey than in states like Texas in gaining access to healthcare.' 99 Similarly, the food
stamps program failed to meet the needs of the poor in many states until the federal
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19 See Kinney, supra note 198, at 857 ("[lIn 1985, New York with over 16 million people spent
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government established uniform eligibility standards for that program. 2°° ACA has
done much to ensure uniformity by requiring Medicaid programs in every state to
cover all persons earning no more than 133% of the federal poverty level.2 °'
ACA was supposed to promote more uniformity through a federal standard for
the essential benefits that healthcare plans would have to provide. A right to
healthcare is insufficient if it gives access to inadequate coverage, so ACA requires
that health plans meet minimally decent standards of coverage. 20 2 With its decision
to let states determine the essential benefits package, HHS has invited states to differ
in the extent to which they ensure adequate coverage to their residents. 2 3 While
ACA cabins the authority of states in defining essential benefits in important
204ways, we once again must worry that residents of some states will end up with a
limited right while residents of other states will end up with a sufficient right.
V. MAKING A RIGHT TO HEALTHCARE MORE STABLE
If ACA provides an unstable right to healthcare or if ACA is found to be
unconstitutional, what alternatives would provide a stable right? Three possibilities
come to mind:
1. The federal government could choose to employ or contract with hospitals,
physicians, and other professionals to treat citizens who need medical
care. Under this British model, the government would act not simply as
an insurer but as a provider of healthcare. 20 5 The Veterans Affairs (VA)
healthcare system takes this approach in the United States. 20 6 By
implementing a fully federal program for all persons that provides care
rather than just coverage, VA-healthcare-for-all would address all of the
causes of instability in U.S. healthcare rights. However, even though the
VA healthcare system has become a model for implementing reforms to
promote quality and reduce cost, 20 7 such an approach is infeasible-it
would quickly come under attack as entailing socialized medicine.
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market. Pear, supra note 197, at Al.
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MED. 21, 22-23 (1993).
206 See About VHA, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFF., http://www.va.gov/health/aboutVHA.asp
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In two options for universal coverage, the federal government would act as
insurer, but not as a provider, of healthcare.
2. In one option, the government would provide healthcare coverage to
everyone, paying hospital, physician, and pharmacy bills, but leaving it
to individuals to choose their physicians and other healthcare
professionals, who would be privately or publicly employed. Medicare
follows this single-payer, Canadian healthcare model.2 °8 While programs
that provide coverage rather than care can leave some beneficiaries with
inadequate access to care, the universality of a Medicare-for-all program
would likely ensure sufficient political support for adequate funding over
time. However, the debate about a single-payer system during the
passage of ACA indicates the current political infeasibility of enacting a
Medicare-for-all system.
20 9
3. Alternatively, the government could provide a voucher to everyone for the
purchase of healthcare insurance, and each person would then find a
private plan for coverage. The voucher would be worth the full cost of
the lowest-cost plan in the market that meets minimum federal standards.
In other words, just as healthcare plans have to meet federal standards to
participate in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, 210 so
would insurers have to meet federal standards for their plans before
Americans could use their vouchers for the plans. Insurers would not be
able to charge higher rates for persons with pre-existing medical
conditions, and they would have to accept vouchers from all comers.
While the voucher would be worth the full cost of the lowest-priced plan,
individuals would have to pay out of pocket for the extra cost of a higher-
priced plan. Thus, insurers would have a strong incentive to offer the
lowest-cost plan. While such a program does not exist in the United
States, it has been proposed by scholars like Alain Enthoven and Victor
Fuchs and adopted as a policy recommendation by the Committee for
Economic Development."'
A voucher-for-all reform also is the most promising path to universal coverage
in terms of its political feasibility. Republicans like U.S. Senator John McCain and
U.S. Representative Paul Ryan have proposed vouchers, albeit in a weak form, 212 in
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large part because vouchers allow for reform that minimizes the role of government
in managing the U.S. healthcare system.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was an important step forward
in the effort to establish meaningful rights to healthcare in the United States. There
is much more to be done, however, before Americans can rely on their healthcare
rights to receive the healthcare that they need.
